Russell Paul La Valle ["
Why They're Human Rights," outlook & opinions, July 27] asks: "Should animals have rights?" His answer is as illogical as he suggests that those who would respond to this question in the affirmative are extreme.
La Valle begins his argument with Peter Singer's unequivocal statement: "There is no sound moral reason why possession of basic rights should be limited to members of a particular species." La Valle does not, however, deem it necessary to develop a sound argument challenging Singer's assertion. Nor does he articulate a position in opposition to granting the basic right of equal consideration of interests to all sentient beings. It would appear that selective reasoning is La Valle's method of choice. He writes,
"A "right" is a moral principle that governs one's freedom of action in society...man is the only being capable of grasping such an abstraction, understanding his actions within a principled framework and adjusting his behavior so as not to violate the rights of others."
This begs the question: Would La Valle grant rights to human infants, or the severely senile? If his argument is to be consistent, when taken to its logical conclusion, rights would not be extended to certain mentally handicapped persons who are as incapable of consciously constraining their actions in accordance with legal or moral dictates as are young calves. Surely an adult hog is more rational than a year old infant. Therefore, by La Valle's logic, shouldn't the adult hog have a better claim to rights than a child?
La Valle's argument seems to be predicated on a philosophical fallacy. He writes,
"Unlike most mammals or other types of creatures, humans are not born with instinctual, inherited knowledge of how to survive. Rather, man's survival is achieved through reason, which allows him to integrate the facts of his surroundings and apply this knowledge to use and shape the natural world for his preservation and advancement."
Therefore, our treatment of animals is, save for abject cruelty, morally justifiable.
La Valle is deriving a principle about what ought to be from statements about what is. He wants to say what we should be doing on the basis of what we are doing. This doesn't follow as a matter of ethics. We can all imagine a society of sexists, for example, in which a group in opposition to patriarchy attempts to institute a principle of full equality. Given La Valle's argument, how can this be accomplished? It cannot, unless one appeals to a statement about what should be, without relying on statements about what actually is.
La Valle, Singer, and legislators in Spain do agree on one point, however: Cruelty to animals is not justifiable. Unfortunately for La Valle's position, his prescription against cruelty belies his own argument. Why is "cruelty to animals...repugnant and morally indefensible" if La Valle is to be consistent? Is he suggesting that A) cruelty to animals isn't a constant presence in our world, or B) that there exists another principle that ought to be considered, which prohibits cruelty? Or C) is he trying to say that cruelty to animals ought to be illegal because there lacks a sound utilitarian reason for torturing a chicken? None of these answers follow from La Valle's previous statements; therefore, it's left up to the reader to deduce on what grounds this prohibition against cruelty rests.
Here, then, La Valle's challenge to the Michael Vick-esk treatment of animals seems to be derived from the same premise that results in Singers position and the resolution in Spain to protect apes from "abuse, torture, and death": Suffering is intrinsically evil and ought to be avoided. La Valle doesn't want to deny this, but he can't quite give up the alleged benefits derived from experimenting on or otherwise torturing these sensitive and intelligent creatures.
We can restate Singer's position then, and ask: To what principle can one appeal when defending the argument that the suffering of an ape should not be counted in our moral decision-making? La Valle's caricature of Singer's argument aside (Singer is, in fact, not advocating teaching apes how to recite the Bill of Rights), granting apes rights is an attempted redress of our collective prejudice against animals. It's a moral statement: Apes suffer in similar ways, with the same intensity, as you or I do; therefore, their interests in not suffering ought to be considered. As Singer argues, there isn't a morally justifiable reason to do otherwise.
La Valle concludes, "let's let apes be apes." This, for La Valle, would apparently include imprisoning apes in cages or performing cocaine addiction tests on them. To grant them rights, however, says "indeed, let's let apes be apes; free, as it were, from suffering because it entertains us to watch their enslavement in zoos." This doesn't "threaten man," it reinforces our position as a moral species.
