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This page is a archive of entries in the Reading category from May 2008.

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Reading: May 2008 Archives

Self-evident animal rights?

Lynn Hunt responds to the apparent inconsistency of the claim that human rights are "self evident" (see the Declaration of Independence), while necessarily having to write them into a document articulating what form these rights take. Hunt argues, "The process had and has a kind of circularity to it: you know the meaning of human rights because you feel distressed when they are violated. The truths of human rights might be paradoxical in this sense, but they are nonetheless still self-evident."

Hunt's insight, I believe, can be applied to animal rights as well: we know the meaning of animal rights because we feel distressed when we see a "downer" cow being dragged to slaughter behind a forklift, for example; when a dog is being forced into combat with another dog we know that both of the animals' rights are being violated. Our "inner sense of outrage" demands the proper response when a hen is sexually assaulted by a slaughterhouse employee. If a horse is starved by her human our moral intuitions say "This is wrong!" 

However, the object(s) of our moral outrage is limited by our collective irrational biases, and prejudices against certain species' of animals, which seems to suggest that the truths of animal rights are not truths at all in the moral sense: animal rights are not universal but culturally relative, subjective constructions. I mean, we all continue to gleefully eat the bodies of billions of animals annually, while Michael Vick spends time in prison for his actions.

The logic of this response, however, can and must also be applied to the context of human rights. I live in Washington D.C., a city populated by thousands upon thousands of homeless men, women and children, who suffer from malnutrition, the elements, psychological trauma, etc. And yet, this continues. Everyday we walk past these individuals, preferring to spend our money on alcohol at one of the local bars instead of spending those dollars on a meal for some pitiful looking homeless women. Rape is used as a weapon of war throughout our world today, but we prefer to bicker about which consenting adults ought to have the opportunity to marry (the right of marriage, of course, is also considered a human right). Infant Chinese girls are considered replaceable, less in value than their male counterparts, but this does not prevent us from enacting policy favoring trade with China. Genocide in Darfur continues. Our government sanctions torture, a form of punishment and interrogation explicitly condemned as immoral in the Declaration of Independence's articulation of those inalienable, universal human rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

Does this suggest that the truths of human rights are in fact not self-evident, but a prudent creation - a fiction? I only have the "right to life" if my government say's so. If not then I don't, and you don't either. "Liberty" is like health care, it's a privilege. Was Jeremy Bentham correct when he argued that talk of moral or inalienable rights is "nonsense upon stilts."

Is this correct? I think, or rather I know, the answer to this question is no. And so do you. Where do they come from? Perhaps reason, Nature or god, our shared sentience; I don't know, but they're real.  

For selfish reason T, U, and V, and for other reasons W, X, Y, and Z we fail to demand action in response to our inner outrage over various moral wrongs; however, we experience that inner outrage nonetheless. This holds true for both human rights and animal rights.

Will be crossposted @ Vegan Soapbox

Nozick's hypothetical:

On the assumption that one can only eat non-animals and be as healthy as those who eat animals, an assumption supported by evidence and common sense, political philosopher Robert Nozick offers this hypothetical:

Suppose that I enjoy swinging a baseball bat. It happens that in front of the only place to swing it stands a cow. Swinging the bat unfortunately would involve smashing the cow's head. But I wouldn't get fun from doing that; the pleasure comes from exercising my muscles, swinging well, and so on. It's unfortunate that as a side effect (not a means) of my doing this, the animal's skull gets smashed. To be sure, I could forgo swinging the bat, and instead bend down and touch my toes or do some other exercise. But this wouldn't be as enjoyable as swinging the bat; I won't get as much fun, pleasure, or delight out of it. 
 
So the question is: would it be all right for me to swing the bat in order to get the extra pleasure of swinging it as compared to the best available alternative activity that does not involve harming the animal? Suppose that it is not merely a question of foregoing today's special pleasure of bat swinging; suppose that each day the same situation arises with a different animal. Is there some principle that would allow killing and eating animals for the additional pleasure this brings, yet would not allow swinging the bat for the extra pleasure that this brings? What could that principle be like?     

Bernard E. Rollin writes, "Plato said, when dealing with adults and ethics, one cannot teach ethics, one can only remind, i.e., help people realize the unnoticed implications of their own beliefs." Therefore, Nozick asks, if you "fail to devise a principle to distinguish swinging the bat from killing and eating an animal, you might decide it's really all right, after all, to swing the bat."

I ask, then, does this hold with your intuitions and moral assumptions?

What could be more morally irrational?

In our current legal situation, I could enter your yard, take your beloved companion animal Fido and beat him within an inch of his life with a metal baseball bat, and Fido would not have legal recourse. What you, as his owner could due is make a legal claim that I have damaged your property, therefore, you have standing and can take direct action against me: your property has been reduced in value. Your dog, who is now blind, deaf, and mentally retarded because of what I have done does not have legal standing because he is not an object of legal or moral concern within our system.

This said, as Bernard E. Rollin writes, since the early nineteenth century legal rights have been extended beyond human persons to include corporations, ships, trusts, cities, and states. It seems highly unreasonable to argue that Exxon Mobil is an object of direct moral concern, yet this corporation, this nonliving entity, has legal rights. Taco Bell has legal standing: if Taco Bell is "harmed," individuals can act as guardians, not as property owners, and file a legal claim on behalf of the corporation. 

The Enron Corporation can be directly harmed under the law, while the only legal harm that occurs when a bull's hind leg's are burned with a blow torch is "property damage."   

In a vegan and morally rational world, animals would enjoy legal standing in themselves, not as property. As Rollin argues

As such, they could institute legal action, or more accurately, have legal action instituted on their behalf (rather than on the behalf of their owner), have injuries to them legally considered (rather than to their owner), and have legal relief directly to their benefit. The relevant legal analogy here is the case of children. Although children cannot press legal claims on their own behalf, they still enjoy legal rights.    

A man recently said that our destruction of the natural world, our relationship with the Earth, is "an outward mirror of our inner self." How apt. It is indeed a reflection of our inner self when we deny legal standing to a feeling animal who is conscious and aware when her interests are being realized or not, but we allow a ship carrying t-shirts and underwear to be an object of direct legal concern.

It should be clear that our collective presupposition that animals are things, but corporations are legal persons, is terribly flawed.      

We are killing our pets as well.

Over at Vegan Soapbox, Eccentric Vegan has written on an issue of vital importance.

Millions of animals are killed each year because nobody wants them:

millions of animals are killed each year because nobody wants them .. millions of animals are killed each year because people are breeding pets .. There is no overt cruelty. In fact, this is "humane." This is what many animal shelters do on a very regular basis. They kill animals.

Several prevention options are discussed, including "Promote Adoption" and "Shut Down Puppymills." Please link to the post, read it, watch the video (below), and spread the word.

Remember, this is killing, not euthanasia. Let's not delude ourselves. Breeders "create" animals to our specifications, we purchase these "products," and then we do it again; often times, animals from breeders end up in shelters as well. But if you buy direct, you fund that enterprise. All while millions of animals are killed in shelters...Our absurd morality in practice.