Are we vegan because we're attempting to avoid harming a nonhuman animal that does not yet exist? Do we boycott those industries that unjustly exploit nonhumans not necessarily for the sake of those already suffering but because we hope to prevent the suffering of those nonhumans that will be brought into existence to be likewise tortured and treated as mere objects?
It's often argued that we actually benefit nonhumans by our actions because they otherwise would not have existed absent our intervention: We give them a chance to live however short and miserable that life may be. We respond by showing how this doesn't follow as a matter of logic because one cannot benefit (or harm) something or someone that doesn't exist. As I wrote in a previous post,
This is illogical on its face: the argument attributes interests or desires to a being that does not yet exist.
- The chicken that was slaughtered to provide me with his flesh desired to be born prior to his actual conception - the chicken had an interest in being alive during his pre-life existence.
- The life force that eventually became the pig had an interest in our intervention in the affairs of the mother and father pigs because this intervention resulted in the conception of the baby pig that was formerly the life force with the initial interest.
Sounds stupid right?
I'm not so sure anymore. If those who believe that suffering is intrinsically evil and ought to be limited to the greatest extent possible go vegan to prevent the torture and exploitation of future generations of nonhumans, the inverse must also be true: We can benefit a nonexistent being.
Doesn't it follow as a matter of logic that we ought to bring nonhumans into existence if they are going to lead a good life?
Practically of course this doesn't hold if we're to accord equal consideration to the interests of all sentient beings as it would imply that we should intervene in the affairs of nonhumans whereby we force the conception of other nonhumans. This would undermine our argument that animals are not things: Individual nonhumans exist as separate entities, like human animals do; therefore, violating their bodily integrity harms an interest that ought to be protected - they have live's of their own. This practical difficulty enters the realm of moral harm.
This argument also suggests, as Peter Singer noted in Animal Liberation, that we ought to bring as many humans into existence as possible (on the presupposition that they will lead a good life). This is flawed as well, although not for the same reason as in the case of nonhumans, assuming that we don't force procreation. Given certain limitations (finite resources, for example), it's implausible that we could bring a limitless number of humans into existence while securing a good life for everyone involved.
I'm sure there are other practical and moral issues involved; however, as a matter of logic, it might be true that we can benefit a nonexistent being. This is all very random I know. It's a non-issue for our purposes given that those who would appeal to this as a justification for breeding and raising animals as property are being internally contradictory:
Treating a person as property is a fundamental moral harm that cannot be justified by this argument because it violates the presupposition that for a nonexistent being to be benefited he/she must be secure in a good life when brought into this world. Me being your property does not a good life make! Therefore it fails tremendously as a sound reason for what we do to billions of nonhumans annually.
However, Jen and I have spoken about this recently. I also had a conversation to this effect with a friend of mine, and I think it's interesting.
Will be crossposted @ Vegan Soapbox
I wouldn't say that we can benefit an non-existent being, but we should not bring into existence a being who will (intentionally or unintentionally) definitely become an exploited and objectified being.
The question is easily resolved if we think of this hypothetical:
Would you and your partner willingly conceive (a human infant) if you were reasonably sure that your offspring would either become severely physically or mentally handicapped or if you were certain that your child would be taken away for slavery?
If your answer to this hypothetical is no, there is no reason (other than speciesism) for the question to be any different in the case of non-humans.
I agree with the latter half of your response Kenneth. However, replace the human infant in your hypothetical with a human infant who is going to lead a "good" life, free of exploitation. Would you agree that it would be a good thing to do that? If yes, I interpret that as suggesting that you can benefit a non-existent being.
Therefore, it follows that if the human infant leading a "good" life were to be replaced with a nonhuman leading a good life, free of exploitation, perhaps we should bring him/her into existence?
It's funny you bring up the human infant with a good life. I was discussing this issue recently with a friend. I mentioned that my husband and I are considering adoption. She thought adoption was a great idea, but she remarked, "Are you sure you'd want to waste your good genes?" She has a point. Most likely, if we had a child of our own, the child would be intelligent, healthy, and would lead a good life. But that's not enough to convince me a biological child is a better choice than an adoptive child. And more importantly, the future is unknown. We can't base any current ethical actions purely on estimations of the future. We MUST consider the present. After all, ethics is more about the means than the ends.
I long ago dismissed this "they owe us for bringing them into existence" argument as complete gibberish, because if being conceived at all is that important, we are all doing an extreme disservice to the children most of us are not bearing at this very moment. I as a woman can't conceive and give birth to every single potential child I could have (if the children I would have with different people at different times count as separate children), because it takes like 9 months, but I am a horrible monster if I don't give birth to as many of them as possible! All those potential children not being conceived! And spaying your cat is also horrible animal abuse, because those kittens really wanted to be euthanized at the pound.
I don't think anyone has brought up this argument seriously in my earshot since high school, because apparently high-schoolers are stupid.
The question is not, "Don't they owe us for bringing them into existence?", but "Can we benefit a nonexistent being - they are the pure object of our interests?" Your right to point out the absurdity in believing that bringing a being into existence confers on that being an obligation to benefit you in return, GLT. But this is a question distinct from that.
I agree with you Elaine: ethics is about the current happiness and suffering, in their various forms, of sentient beings. I simply think this is an interesting theoretical point.
Yes, the question you're asking here is different, but they're still related because if someone says that a week-long life of torture is still better than never existing, they're answering "yes" to whether we can benefit nonexistent beings. And this is the only place I've ever heard the question asked or implied, so I thought it was in the context of being an assumption that people use to prop up that argument, which sounds a lot like the examples about the chicken and the pig. Sorry if I sounded dismissive. (Well, it was also implied in a question about whether the chance that one kitten could lead a happy life justified not spaying a stray cat, but that was presented by someone arguing that no, that was really irresponsible to sacrifice all the other resulting kittens.)
As for whether we can benefit beings who don't exist yet, I think of it like this: we can create conditions that will benefit whoever happens to come into existence, but we probably should not deliberately bring beings into existence just because we have good conditions prepared. Practically, in the current state of the world, there are too many individuals of many species already. For example, if you were a superwealthy dog owner, you might feel justified in breeding your dog because you could take care of all the puppies for their whole lives, but you would do better to adopt a litter of unwanted puppies.
And then there is the question of whether even the most advantaged life is necessarily good. We all want to hear life-affirming messages, but all life involves suffering, so maybe coming into existence is not actually positive, even if you granted nonexistent beings an interest in whether or not they were conceived and born. I'm not arguing for voluntary extinction, but I don't see a reason to cause individuals to be born other than to become a (biological) parent (and I don't want to interfere with humans' informed reproductive choices) or to preserve an endangered species (and such efforts don't necessarily take into account the interests of the individuals of that species involved).
We can work now for the good of the as-yet-unborn but causing them to be born probably won't result in a net good. I wouldn't argue that it would unless maybe we were a super-advanced futuristic world with a dwindling population.
Quote:
"We can work now for the good of the as-yet-unborn but causing them to be born probably won't result in a net good."
Bingo! I agree with this statement completely, GLT.