On the assumption that one can only eat non-animals and be as healthy as those who eat animals, an assumption supported by evidence and common sense, political philosopher Robert Nozick offers this hypothetical:
Suppose that I enjoy swinging a baseball bat. It happens that in front of the only place to swing it stands a cow. Swinging the bat unfortunately would involve smashing the cow's head. But I wouldn't get fun from doing that; the pleasure comes from exercising my muscles, swinging well, and so on. It's unfortunate that as a side effect (not a means) of my doing this, the animal's skull gets smashed. To be sure, I could forgo swinging the bat, and instead bend down and touch my toes or do some other exercise. But this wouldn't be as enjoyable as swinging the bat; I won't get as much fun, pleasure, or delight out of it.
So the question is: would it be all right for me to swing the bat in order to get the extra pleasure of swinging it as compared to the best available alternative activity that does not involve harming the animal? Suppose that it is not merely a question of foregoing today's special pleasure of bat swinging; suppose that each day the same situation arises with a different animal. Is there some principle that would allow killing and eating animals for the additional pleasure this brings, yet would not allow swinging the bat for the extra pleasure that this brings? What could that principle be like?
Bernard E. Rollin writes, "Plato said, when dealing with adults and ethics, one cannot teach ethics, one can only remind, i.e., help people realize the unnoticed implications of their own beliefs." Therefore, Nozick asks, if you "fail to devise a principle to distinguish swinging the bat from killing and eating an animal, you might decide it's really all right, after all, to swing the bat."
I ask, then, does this hold with your intuitions and moral assumptions?
This is the same sort of issue raised by what criminologist Piers Beirne calls 'interspecies sexual assault' - bestiality.
This is an issue that causes animal welfarists and other animal users no end of problems since some sex with sme nonhuman animals creates arguably less harm than meat eating and dairy using. Of course, we are near Peter Singer-type controversy here...
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Roger
That is an interesting point, Roger. In my discussions with omnivores and welfarists I have never mentioned this; however, as you said, this is a Singer-type controversy indeed. I have heard him mention this issue in several interviews - although it was done in passing if you will.
"Utilitarianism for animals," as Nozick argues, is facially what we employ in our relationships with them; however, comparable harms and like-interests are never considered given their status as property. Therefore, while "bestiality" is the lesser affront to the individual, Utilitarian calculations are truly never employed. So I don't know how far we would get with this argument.
I wish I had interviewed Nozick for the movie, but he died. :-( He was so eloquent.
Anyhow, brilliant analogy - I think the "nature" argument is the main thing people psychologically have to overcome. Once they do, the principles that they already hold point dead-on to opposing the use of animals for food.
Torturing and killing animals because we prefer the way they taste is literally torturing and killing them for fun - plain and simple. No better than those who torture and kill dogs in the street.
Remember though: people aren't evil - we're just inherently irrational when our interests are concerned. We're wired that way because there was an evolutionary advantage to it.
Incidentally, there are good arguments for the position that welfare reforms are currently more important than vegan outreach. I always read the latest research on factory farms (in my spare time, you know), and HSUS compiles some of the best on battery cages, which you can see here:
http://www.hsus.org/web-files/PDF/farm/hsus-a-comparison-of-the-welfare-of-hens-in-battery-cages-and-alternative-systems.pdf
...and gestation crates, which you can see here:
http://www.hsus.org/web-files/PDF/farm/HSUS-Report-on-Gestation-Crates-for-Pregnant-Sows.pdf
Without going into too much detail, it is difficult to argue that the main reason we're against factory farming is anything but the suffering caused to the animals. If this is true, and if the reforms end suffering, they are inherently valuable on our own premises.
I have been tempted to support only abolition because I am angry at the idea that we enslave other species, and I cannot imagine fighting for more humane slavery. But, sadly, that is the irrational world we live in, and negotiating with an evil system to make is less evil does do good.
Also, it IS true that reforms make the public feel better about animal exploitation. Thus, it DOES make sense to publicly oppose reforms, even if you think they're good, and/or to make clear when discussing reforms that the goal is abolition (which PETA now does).
That said, I have nothing but admiration for those who focus all of their time and energy on vegan outreach. You're like Oskar Schindler.
Thanks for the comment Mark!
Less suffering is always desirable; however, this depends on Consequentialist reasoning and a way to quantify "progress" to this end. It seems reasonable to argue that as we institutionalize these "improvements," the suffering mitigated is replaced by other forms of suffering, which in turn is justified because the initial instance of "improving the situation." Call's to end the crating of veal calve's is an example of this, I believe.
The absence of gestation crates is reasonably viewed as a method that inflicts less suffering than the other options; however, does this help in attaining the necessary and just change of ending the exploitation of nonhumans, in all its forms, which itself is a form of suffering.
Regan make's this point about the many forms of suffering. "Suffering" mustn't be reduced down to an instance of pain, or existing in pain, because this fails to address other forms of suffering: denying all that is natural to the animal, what is his/her telos, because of their status as property. Restricted movement or the removal of a mother’s offspring, for example, are also forms of suffering, that only vegan outreach can help to alleviate. Welfare reforms seem to institutionalize this "progress," ending the most egregious examples, while justifying the underlying persistent examples of suffering.
I think that vegan outreach is non-reductionist. Ending the status of animals as things is the only method I can see that addresses "suffering" in all its forms. Although maybe I'm wrong - I would never oppose untethering baby cows.