Sentience is defined as "the ability to feel or perceive subjectively." Jeremy Bentham understood sentience as the "ability to experience suffering." Gary Francione argues that sentience is the means to the end of ensuring life (e.g., evolution has instilled in us the ability to experience pain, which is perceived as harmful to life and thus triggers the "flight response").
Sentience is important because if X is sentient he is the type of being who has interests. For example, if Jake the bull quickly removes his hoof from a hot surface, it is reasonable to infer that he has experienced pain (or an unpleasant shock); one can deduce from Jake's actions that he has an interest in not continuing to experience the pain of having his hoof on a hot surface - he has an interest in not being in pain or in removing himself from the unpleasant situation.
In practice (and theory), Speciesism is a prejudice against allowing Jake's interests any moral weight; in fact, due to his membership in a species different than Homo sapiens, Jake is viewed as having no relevant interests at all. In so doing, Jake the bull (a sentient being) move's from his proper [and natural] role as a person, to the role of a thing.
A rock for example, as Peter Singer argues, is a thing: the type of thing that is incapable of having any interests at all. A rock does not have an interest in not being kicked down the street because the rock is not capable of "feeling or perceiving subjectively"; a rock does not care what I do to it because it is incapable of caring what I do to it. As a result of our Speciesism, we have two options. One, Jake the bull is forced to assume a role similar in kind to that of a rock: if Jake is "stunned" improperly and thus conscious while he is being skinned and gutted, like the rock, he doesn't have an interest in not experiencing this because it (Jake is no longer a he) is incapable of experiencing anything. Without interests, our moral responsibilities are absolved. Or two, Jake is rightfully viewed as sentient, which means he can subjectively experience what is happening to him, however, he is not a human animal; as such, our interest in pleasing our palate trumps his interest in not being tortured and murdered.
Both options leave a very bad taste in my mouth.
What if we were to substitute Jake the bull for 'Jake the family dog'? Would Jake be viewed in his proper form - as a sentient being? If so, is his ability to perceive pain (and pleasure in the absence of pain) of any moral significance?
Gary Francione has identified our "moral schizophrenia," meaning we view companion animals such as dogs and cats as relevant members of our moral community (see the collective outrage over Michael Vick's actions); indeed, a majority of our companion animals are viewed as another member of the family - like a child or loved one. Francione, then, would ask, what moral or empirical difference is there between 'Jake the member of your family' and Jake the bull whom you barbequed for dinner last night?
It's an excellent question. Don't shy away from the answer because you feel stupid when you really think about it. It's at the same time so clear and undeniably irrational: there is no moral or empirical difference between these two sentient beings. Jake the bull, Jake the family dog, you, me, your mother, and your father are all sentient beings: we are all individuals who can subjectively experience what is happening to us, and we all have an interest in not suffering (in all its terrible forms).
Foolishness reigns when human animals simply negate their moral duties because it's inconvenient to be rational.
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